In Process
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Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe (Draft: 6.23.09)
This paper is a response to an argument put forward by Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux (2009). Earlenbaugh and Molyneux argue intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. This conclusion arises out of an analysis that shows intuitions are incapable of being treated as evidence. I argue against this conclusion by undermining key aspects of Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument. In the first section, I explain important distinctions and argumentative tools in Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument. In section 2, I argue against the structure of their argument and block the move they make at the outset of their paper. In the third section, I argue against the idea that intuitions are not basic evidential sources. In section 4, I argue the psychological targets of intuition (i.e., the propositions intuited) are capable of being treated as evidence because they are both belief-entailing and credence-entailing. In the final section, I present two case studies—philosophical practice around the Gettier intuition and the debate between armchair philosophy and experimental philosophy—as examples that show intuitions are treated as evidence by the philosophical community.
Thesis - The Evidential Weight of Considered Moral Judgments (Draft: 5.28.09)
The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection considered moral judgments (CMJs) are not truth-conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. I solve the input objection by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. In the first half of the thesis I set-up the input objection, explore potential responses to the objection and uncover the best way to solve the objection. The second half of the thesis solves the input objection by defining key terms, detailing the revised RE procedure, reinserting the notion of a competent moral judge into the method, using intuitionist criteria for identifying genuine moral intuitions, creating three filters capable of sorting good from bad CMJs, and showing how it is possible to assign evidential weight to CMJs so that they can be used as standards against which moral principles can be measured and a justified moral theory realized.
The Moderate Interpretation of Reflective Equilibrium
In this paper I critique an interpretation of reflective equilibrium advanced by Michael DePaul. I respond to deficiencies in DePaul's interpretation by creating my own interpretation of the method.
The Methodological Principle in Art as Performance
This paper analyzes and reformulates David Davies’ methodological
principle in his major book Art as Performance. a Wordle of my blog, click to see large
Reflective Equilibrium and the Dependence Problem
In this paper, I argue that objections to the method of reflective equilibrium can be overcome by revising the coherentist model of justification and appealing to the literature on belief revision. The primary objection considered is the dependence problem of justification. This objection holds that the method of reflective equilibrium is underdetermined. T.M. Scanlon focuses on how the starting points of the process might underdetermine the outcome, and Daniel Bonevac focuses on how reflective equilibria are underdetermined by adjustment decisions made between judgments, principles and theories. It is argued that these concerns are alleviated by relaxing the assumption of logical closure by shifting from a model of coherence founded on belief sets to a model founded on belief bases. Coherence between considered judgments, moral principles and background theories is typically cast as a categorical concept. Instead, I appropriate a gradational notion of coherence borrowed from the epistemology of belief revision, and I apply the concept to argue that it is possible to realize degrees of reflective equilibrium. This opens up the possibility of an interpersonal comparison of degrees of justification according to how effectively a person holds the reflective equilibrium their decisions embody. This is possible because beliefs within reflective equilibria can be more or less expressive when operating under conditions of change. Lastly, it is argued that discrepancies between judgments, principles and theories can be prioritized based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment.
Reflective Equilibrium and the Dependence Problem
In this presentation I outline the main points of the dependence problem.
Published
The Utilibot Project: An AMR Based on Utilitarianism
As autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) begin living in the home, performing service tasks and assisting with daily activities, their actions will have profound ethical implications. Consequently, AMRs need to be outfitted with the ability to act morally with regard to human life and safety. Yet, in the area of robotics where morality is a relevant field of endeavor (i.e. human-robot interaction) the sub-discipline of morality does not exist. In response, the Utilibot project seeks to provide a point of initiation for the implementation of ethics in an AMR. The Utilibot is a decision-theoretic AMR guided by the utilitarian notion of the maximization of human well-being. The core ethical decision-making capacity of the Utilibot consists of two dynamic Bayesian networks that model human and environmental health, a dynamic decision network that accounts for decisions and utilities, and a Markov decision process (MDP) that decomposes the planning problem to solve for the optimal course of action to maximize human safety and well-being.